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Abstract
Trust is indispensable to duciary elds (e.g., credit rating), where experts exercise
wide discretion on behalf of others. Can the shame from a scandal sort trustworthy
people out of a duciary eld? I tested for the possibility that a shame externality
can sort in a charitable contribution game where subjects could be "ungenerous" when
unobserved. After establishing that "generosity" required a contribution of more than
$6, subjects were given the choice of contributing either $5 publicly or $0-$10 privately.
20/22 control subjects chose to contribute privately less than $2. 10/26 treatment
subjects, after being told the prediction that they were unlikely to contribute more
than $2, if they contributed privately, contributed $5 publicly. (This group also showed
higher shame sensitivity.) This suggests that the mere belief that a subject would
exploit the greater discretion and unobservability of a duciary-like position can deter
entry into such a position. Thus, scandals that create such a belief could repel shame-
sensitive people from that eld possibly to the detriment of the eld and the economy
as a whole.
JEL Codes: C91, C72, H41, H42
Keywords: shame, psychological game theory, beliefs preferences, charitable con-
tributions game, duciary
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1 Introduction
President Obama called Wall Street bankers shameful for giving themselves
nearly $20 billion in bonuses as the economy deteriorated and the government
spent billions to bail out some of the nations most prominent nancial institu-
tions. [Stolberg and Labaton, 2009]
Id almost rather say Im a pornographer,said a retired Wall Street executive.
[Segal, 2009].
Trust is indispensable to duciary elds, where experts exercise wide discretion according
to unobservable, subjective judgments. Clients of doctors, dentists, credit rating agencies,
investment bankers, clergy, accountants...teachers need to trust the duciary for the same
reason that they need their services lack of expertise. An unmeasured (to my knowledge)
consequence of recent scandals among nancial duciaries, where trust was betrayed, is that
persons most sensitive to the shaming belief that they may also be untrustworthy, might avoid
scandalized tasks, leave, or never enter the profession. They may opt for non-duciary work
where they are fully observed, and therefore, will be rewarded for moral behavior, instead of
duciary work, where they are unobserved but suspected of immoral behavior due to the taint
of scandal. If shame sensitivity positively correlates with trustworthiness, scandals could do
grave damage to a profession and make future scandals even more likely through a shame
externalitywhich causes trustworthy people to exit and untrustworthy people to enter 1.
Though the issue of whether the shame externality from a scandal can sort people in
duciary elds is an empirical question, shame aversion is not measured in job interviews,
nor perhaps more importantly, when one chooses majors in college. Even if it were, since
we want to measure the sorting power of shame, we would want to measure those people
who would have but did not apply for a job or a college major. Thus, to see if the shame
externality of a scandal can sort, a controlled experiment is required.
[Tadelis, 2007] established experimentally that betrayals of trust can be deterred by the
threat of mere observation of that betrayal, presumably from shame. Whether the suspicion
incited by others shameful actions when unobserved could deter a person from entering
into a similar unobserved situation has yet to be addressed. This is what is tested in the
1Shame may have sorted the more trustworthy people out of:
1. Accounting after the indictment of Arthur Andersen.
2. Credit rating agencies after the conict of interest scandals associated withe the internet stocks bubble.
3. Politics after a major corruption scandal.
4. The Catholic clergy after the pedophilia scandal.
5. The mortgage lending business after the recent subprime mortgage crisis.
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following public goods contribution game where shame is induced by the belief that one will
be ungenerous when unobserved.
48 subjects spent about 20 minutes taking the TOSCA-3, a standard test for shame
and guilt aversion in psychology, which they were told was a personality test to predict
their likely level of generosity to a famous charity. After they revealed that generosity(on
average) required a contribution of more than $6 of the $10 they would earn, they were given
the choice of contributing either $5 publicly or $0-$10 privately. All but 2 out of 22 of the
control subjects contributed privately, less than $2. 10 out of 26 of the treatment subjects
contributed $5 publicly, after being told that given their low test scores, they were unlikely to
contribute more than $2, if they contributed privately. The p-value was 0.022. The TOSCA-3
score for shame aversion gives an independent check for separation. It went from an average
of 46 for both the treatment and the control groups to an average of 45 for those who chose
private and 49 for those who chose public in the treatment group. A probit regressions of the
choice of public on shame sensitivity resulted in a p-value of 0.3. The guilt sensitivity showed
no such sorting and was constant at 62 across both those who chose private and those who
chose public.
The increased willingness to pay to seem generous suggests that the mere belief that a
subject might exploit the wide discretion and unobservability (e.g., give $0-$10 unobserved)
of a duciary like position can deter entry into such a position. Thus, scandals which create
such beliefs could change a duciary eld by repelling shame-sensitive people possibly to
the detriment of the eld and the economy as a whole, if shame sensitivity is positively
correlated with trustworthiness.
This result that shame of others can sort more trustworthy people out of situations in
which they might exploit moral hazard is consistent with the predictions of the pooling and
separating equilibria of [Ong, 2008a]3. To my knowledge, there are no other papers on belief
or shame externalities, though [Lazear et. al, 2009] allows potential proposers to sort out
of ultimatum games.
There are broader applications for this notion of shame externality since subjective judg-
ments are ubiquitous, for instance, in hiring and promotion decisions by managers4. Scan-
dalous prejudicial hiring practices within a rm can impose a belief externality on similar
unobservable subjective judgments of others within the rm or the industry, which may result
in public but suboptimal actions or appeasing speech acts political correctness on the part
2I would like to thank Karl Schlag for making me aware of the Fishers Exact-Boschloo test, which
performs exact, unconditional tests of homogeneity. It is uniformly more powerful than Fishers exact test.
See [Schlag, 2008] for his notes. See [Berger, 2005] for the calculation software. See [Greenland, 1991] for the
justication for the use of the unconditional p-value.
3This conrms the predicted separating (Eq. 4) and pooling (Eq. 1) equilibria in [Ong, 2008a].
4"But outsiders or lower-level employees are seldom privy to the complex deliberations and the raft of
subjective judgments that go into the selection of the top people in any large, complex organization." See
[Loury, 1996].
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of everyone who has to make such subjective judgments5.
The psychology literature has focused upon measuring shame, but not its externalities.
See [Tracy et. al, 2007] for a recent compilation of signicant research in psychology.
The outline of the experiment follows. The rationale of the experiment is in Section 3.
Possible issues with the experiment are addressed in Section 3.5.
2 Experimental Design
1. Advertisements for subjects with the heading, "Make $10 in 40 minutes," were placed
around campus and on Facebook. Subjects were then asked for their availability for on
certain days, and assigned a time slot based on their answer.
2. Upon arrival, I read the Instructions and Consent of Appendix A to the subject
(Bobfor convenience) and walked him through the experiment.
3. Bob took a standard psychological test that measures guilt and shame sensitivity
(TOSCA-3), which contains 17 questions with 4 or 5 parts each that requires about
20 minutes to complete. Bob was told that the test was to predict his likely level of
generosity to Doctors Without Borders (DWB) a famous charity. I added a question
about Bobs major and whether he had contributed to DWB within the last year. There
were no other identiers. Bob scored his own test to maintain his anonymity.
4. Bob was then asked howmuch generousand ungeneroustypes of UCDavis students
would give of the $10 that they would earn from the experiment. See Appendix B for
the survey. The prior subject (Alicefor convenience) was called in from surng the
web to witness this. (The rst prior subject was a student confederate.)
5. If Bob was in the control group, he was told that a prediction based upon his test score
about his likely level of contribution would not be made. If Bob was in the treatment
group, he was told that a prediction would be made.
6. In the control group Alice (always with the experimenter present) read out to Bob,
Do you want to choose the private option, where you can contribute whatever you like
or contribute $5 here as you hand in the test?.
7. In the treatment group, before Bob was given the choice between public or private
contribution in step 6, Alice asked Bob, Is your score below 438? If Bob said yes,
5"...Consider diversity training.Texaco has pledged some $35 million for employee workshops on race
relations...I doubt that anyone astute enough to rise to the top of a major corporation really believes that
diversity workshops are the way to get blacks and whites to work together with mutual respect. But few
will now dare give candid expression to that view. Hiring a diversity consultant is a primary way for the
company to show its concern for minority sensibilities."[Loury, 1996][Eichenwald, 1996]
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Alice then read out, According to our past experience, you are not likely to contribute
more than $2, if you choose the private option.He was then given the choice in step
6.
8. Bob was paid either immediately before he was given the choice in steps 6 or 7, or
immediately after, in one case deviating from the order in the Instructions and Consent.
Though these di¤erent orderings, which were done for the sake of robustness, could
constitute di¤erent treatments, the e¤ect of the announcement can be made more or less
e¤ective by a particular order of payment. Below, I test for the statistical signicance
of the announcement regardless of the order of the choice of public or private and
payment.
9. Bob followed through with his choice. If Bob chose the private option, he would walk
into room 109 next door, close the door and put whatever money he wanted to con-
tribute with his test into an envelope, and then, into a sealed box. Bob had been told
that the box would not be opened until at least three other subjects had done the same.
3 Rationale for Experimental Design
3.1 Increasing Subjects Shame Sensitivity
TOSCA-3 asks subjects to imagine themselves in 17 scenarios in which they might feel shame.
I used this test to prime subjects for the possibility of shame, because in e¤ect, it asks subjects
to practice feeling ashamed in imagination. An example of a question from TOSCA-3:
Figure 1: TOSCA-3 questions.
According to the psychology literature, shame is due to beliefs about others beliefs [Tracy et. al, 2007]
that one has violated some norm or standard of behavior. Whatever shame Bob might feel
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from taking the private option after Alice announces her belief that he will act ungenerously,
I tried to leveraged that shame further by the apparent scientic validity of that belief.
Bob scored his own test to preserve his anonymity. The score was a weighted average
of test answers based on the hypothesis that generosity is correlated with guilt sensitivity.
The score was heavily weighted by the answer of an added question whether the subject
contributed to Doctors Without Borders (DWB) in the last year. The score was designed to
camouage the relationship between the numerical values of the answers and our prediction
for the subjects level of contribution, so as to make it less likely that the subject would try
to game the test (e.g., answer yes to the DWB question and be condent that we believed
that he would contribute generously when observed) and hence obviate the need to prove his
generosity by giving $5 publicly.
3.2 Establishing Norms of Generosity
On average, subjects estimated that the generous type would contribute more than $6 and the
ungenerous $0. Bobs estimate was intended to credibly establish the type space: generous
and ungenerous, with respect to which Bob could signal his own type (e.g., contribute more
than the ungenerous type so as to decrease the probability of being thought ungenerous). The
accuracy of the prediction did not matter for the experiment. What mattered was that Bob
credibly committed himself to a high and therefore costly (above $2) standard of generosity
in front of Alice and the experimenter. In fact, Alice, who may take a low estimate personally,
was there in part to bias Bobs estimate upwards.
3.3 The Choice Between Observable (Public) and Unobservable
(Private) Contributions
The public option of contributing $5 was restricted. Therefore, it was (monetarily) dominated
by the private option, where the subject could contribute $0-$10. However, unlike the private
option, it permitted the subject to make evident to observers that he was not the ungenerous
type. Hence, it may not be dominated if non-monetary payo¤s are taken into account.
3.4 Treatment
Alice only asked, Is your score below 438?instead of the actual score because that could
be used to identify Bob with his contribution, via his test which he put in the same envelope,
thus undermining the unobservedness of the private option. His score could only be above
that number if he contributed to DWB within the previous year. If he answered yes, Alice
read out to him, According to our past experience, you are not likely to contribute more
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than $2, if you choose the private option6.This announcement of the expectation of low
contribution levels was designed to induce shame conditional on the private option being
taken. It played the same role as the drug rm representatives remark "One hand was the
other" in Fishy Gifts[Ong, 2008a], where reciprocation was shameful.
Prior subjects were a cheap way to increase the number of observers to two (including the
experimenter), which should increase the degree of shame. By having a prior subject make
the announcement from a script, I could further minimize experimenter demand e¤ects. By
allowing the announcer to vary, I could exploit randomization and avoid announcer xed
e¤ects. See below for a discussion of across subject correlation and experimenter demand
e¤ects.
3.5 Limitations and Possible Problems with the Experiment
Excluded Subjects 7 subjects were excluded. Four were excluded because two walked
in on the choices of the other two, possibly jeopardizing the assumption of independence
between subjects. Two other subjects were excluded because they arrived together, and I
made a snap judgment that excluding one could change the remaining subjects attitude and
hence reactions. Another subject was excluded because she being a non-student, University
of California in her 60s, was very di¤erent from all the rest.
Possible Experimenter Demand E¤ects I was testing for the e¤ect of observers beliefs
on subjects behavior. Shame, which would normally be a confound in other experiments
was what was being tested for here. Though it is in principle possible here as in other
experiments that experimenter demand drove the results, there are several facts which make
the possibility less likely.
1. The announcement was only about the beliefs of the experimenter and not about the
experimenters preferences. Hence, experimenter demand could only come from the
existence of the announcement as opposed to its content. However, the possibility of
the announcement was constant across the control and treatment groups, and thus,
would not be a good candidate for the driver of the treatment e¤ect. What was unique
to the treatment group, the actual announcement, was pre-determined by the results
of pilot experiments a factor exogenous to the current experiment. Its di¢ cult to see
how that di¤erence could induce experimenter demand e¤ects.
2. The di¤erence in the TOSCA-3 scores for shame aversion between those who chose
public (49) and private (45) in the treatment groups further suggests that subjects had
been sorted by shame. See Figure 2 below. A probit test for nding the probability of
6This estimate was gleened from past pilot experiments with other designs.
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Figure 1: Figure 2: TOSCA-3 Shame Aversion Score for Treatment Group
choosing public based upon shame sensitivity showed a p-value of 0.3. There was no
comparable change with the TOSCA-3 score for guilt aversion. It was constant at 62
in the treatment group for both those who chose to contribute publicly and those who
chose to contribute privately 7. Since the TOSCA-3 test was administered before the
announcement, its score could not have been a¤ected by the announcement.
Unclear Instructions Some of the instructions were less than clear. For example, the
subject was not told what would happen if there were not 3 other subjects who made private
contributions. No one asked and I did not explain how or why a psychological test would
be used to predict a subjects level of generosity. I did not try to dispel these ambiguities
due to time or budget constraints or because I didnt want the subject to think too much
about the experiment, or because I believed that opaqueness could prevent the subject from
being strategic in their choice. In any case, confusion should lead to greater randomness or
to suspicion of the legitimacy of the experiment and therefore, less contribution in public.
Both should bias the level of signicance downwards.
Possible Correlation Across Subjects There is the possibility that Bobs choice was
not entirely independent of Alices since Alice read out the prediction to Bob. However, the
monetary payo¤s of Bobs choices were fully revealed the game was full information except
for beliefs. Therefore, Alice could only have communicated new information about her beliefs
about Bob in her actions. The e¤ect of this belief, i.e., shame, was what was being tested
7Guilt aversion in the treatment group was signicantly higher than the control group (57) for reasons
that I cannot explain.
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for. For that purpose, it didnt matter that Alice had been a prior subject. Thus, though the
prior subject read out the prediction for the current subject, the independence assumption
necessary for the Fishers Exact-Boschloo test still applies.
Possible Day E¤ect In my inexperience, I did not randomize subject assignments, but
made the choice of treatment or control on the day of the experiment, before the subject
arrived. Most experiments were done on Wednesdays. 52% of these were treatments. 62% of
Thursdaysand 67% of Fridaysexperiments were treatments. None of the 5 experiments that
were done on one Tuesday were treatments. However, the average TOSCA-3 shame aversion
scores of treatment and control groups were the same: 46, showing that with regards to the
relevant characteristics, there was no systematic bias. The data is available upon request.
Skepticism about the Privacy of the Private Option If subjects did not regard the
private option as actually unobserved, then, contrary to my actual results, there should not
have been any signicant treatment e¤ect on the probability with which subjects chose the
private option. That may explain why those who gave privately in the treatment group
also gave on average $2.3 instead of $1.5, the amount given privately in the control group
(p-value=0.15). A number of the subjects in the control group gave privately $5 or more,
suggesting that either they believed that they were being monitored or they were rebelling
and thought it was worthwhile to raise the average contribution level even if they could not
be identied.
Miscellaneous Possible Problems
1. If subjects did not think that their contribution would actually go to DWB, then
contrary to my results, they would only have chosen the private option and contributed
nothing.
2. There could have been shame in the private option even when subjects were untreated.
This shame would not explain the change in behavior when subjects were treated.
3. The public contribution could be due to a self-image preference. However, the subjects
in the control group, those who were not treated with the announcement of observers
beliefs, did not mind taking the private option and making a low contribution. Pre-
sumably, subjects self image is independent of an announcement of observersbeliefs
about what a subject will do when unobserved.
4. "Score your test" in 7) of Instructions and Consent should have read "evaluate your
score" in the instructions and consent. The subject could have thought that the
anonymity could be broken, which could bias the way they write the TOSCA-3.
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4 Conclusion
The results of the above experiments suggest that the shame spillovers from scandals can sort
people out of duciary-like positions according to their shame sensitivity If shame sensitivity
also correlates with trustworthiness, then, not only would scandals damage the eld, the dam-
age to the reputation of the eld would select for people who would further damage the eld.
President Obamas shaming ofWall Street employees [Stolberg and Labaton, 2009][Segal, 2009]
could therefore have exactly the opposite e¤ect from what he intended.
But, even without a scandal, duciary positions should attract the least trustworthy
people because they have the most to gain or least to lose from betraying trust. According
to Raymond W. McDaniel of Moodys[McDonald, 2008]:
The real problem is not that the market . . . underweight[s] ratings quality but
rather that in some sectors, it actually penalizes quality. . . . It turns out that
ratings quality has surprisingly few friends: issuers want high ratings; investors
dont want ratings downgrades; short-sighted bankers labor short-sightedly to
game the ratings agencies.McDaniel then tells his board: Unchecked, compe-
tition on this basis can place the entire nancial system at risk.Furthermore,
though Moodys has erected safeguards to keep teams from too easily solving the
market share problem by lowering standards. This does NOT solve the problem.
Given this problem of adverse selection into duciary professions, how is it possible that
duciary professions function at all? What institutional measures exist to counteract the
adverse selection to duciary elds? In [Ong 2008b], I model how institutional arrangements
in duciary professions, like pro-bono work, can save the reputation of a eld by sorting
people who might exploit trust out of the eld.
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4.1 Appendix A: Instructions and Consent
This experiment will proceed as follows:
1. You will be asked to take a standard psychological test of 17 questions that we
will use to estimate your likely level of generosity to Doctors Without Borders (DWB), an
organization which brings western doctors to parts of the world where medical care is urgently
needed but not available.
2. To preserve anonymity, you will score your own test using an Excel spreadsheet.
Write down your score on the piece of paper provided, but do not show it to us. Then close
the spreadsheet without saving.
3. Before another UCD student, you will be asked to state an estimate of how much,
a. a generous type of UCD student would give of the $10 that they earn to DWB.
b. an ungenerous type of UCD student would give of the $10 that they earn to DWB.
4. After you make your estimate, you will be paid $10 and asked to sign for it. After
you sign for it, the money is yours.
5. Then, you will be given the opportunity to donate $5 when you hand in the test,
or any amount you think appropriate anonymously in room 109. If you take the anonymous
option, please put the test and the money in the envelope provided. A receipt from Doctors
Without Borders for the cumulative amount of money will be posted on the web at the end
of the experiment in a few weeks.
6. Before you contribute, we may or may not score your test and inform you of how
much you are likely to contribute should you choose the anonymous option. If we score your
test, the previous participant will read you the prediction.
7. This test is anonymous. There is nothing to identify you with your contribution
or your test score. For the purpose of the experiment, we will only record your major. For
the purpose of paying you, we will keep a receipt of your guess and the fact that we paid
you. You will be asked to stay until the next participant makes their choice. That way, you
can also be sure that the box remains unopened, thus preserving your anonymity. We would
not open the box until at least 3 participants have taken the anonymous option.
I understand these instructions and would like to participate in the experiment
Name______________________________
Signature______________________________Date_____________
4.2 Appendix B: Experimental Subjects Predictions
Circle your estimate of the average contribution of generous people.
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$0
$1
$2
$3
$4
$5
$6
$7
$8
$9
$10
Circle your estimate of the average contribution of not generous people.
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